

## Social Consequences of Securitizing Citizenship: Two-Tiered Citizenry and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes

### Abstract

In response to the rise in terrorism after the turn of the millennium, multiculturalist countries such as Australia, Britain and Canada introduced policies that make it easier to revoke the citizenships of dual nationals. These policies primarily target naturalized immigrants and their descendants. Ongoing debates indicate that more countries plan to follow suit. Some scholars argue that easy revocation policies create two-tiered political communities, where one group of citizens have a stronger status security than the other. This study builds on their perspectives, and argues that majority members should be more likely to hold anti-immigrant attitudes in countries where state policies discriminate against citizens in terms of status security. To test this hypothesis, this study employs multilevel regression analysis. Data come from European Values Study (2008), European Social Survey (2014), and Eurobarometer (2015), and cover thirty European countries. Findings offer support for the proposed hypothesis. In countries where immigrants have low status security, majority members are more likely to have negative attitudes toward immigrants. The results hold not only for immigrants in general but also for Muslim immigrants in particular.

**Keywords:** Citizenship, dual nationality, immigrants, immigration, intergroup prejudice, revocation

### Résumé

En réponse à la montée du terrorisme après le tournant du millénaire, des pays multiculturalistes tels que l'Australie, la Grande-Bretagne et le Canada ont mis sur pied des politiques qui rendent plus facile la révocation de la citoyenneté des doubles nationalités. Ces politiques visent prioritairement les immigrants naturalisés et leurs descendants. Les débats en cours soutiennent que plus de pays prévoient d'appliquer la même politique. Certains chercheurs affirment que les politiques de révocation faciles créent des communautés politiques à deux niveaux, où un groupe de citoyens a un statut de sécurité plus rigide que l'autre. Cette étude s'appuie sur leur point de vue et postule que la majorité des membres serait plus susceptible d'avoir des attitudes anti-immigrantes dans les pays où les politiques de l'État discriminent les citoyens en termes de statut de sécurité. Pour vérifier cette hypothèse, cette étude se sert d'une analyse de régression à plusieurs niveaux. Les données proviennent de *European Values Study* (2008), *European Social Survey* (2014) et *Eurobarometer* (2015), et couvrent trente pays européens. Les résultats corroborent l'hypothèse proposée. Dans les pays où les immigrants ont un faible statut de sécurité, la majorité des membres est plus susceptible d'avoir des attitudes négatives à l'égard des immigrants. Les résultats concernent non seulement les immigrants en général, mais aussi les immigrants musulmans en particulier.

**Mots clés :** Citoyenneté, double nationalité, immigrants, immigration, préjugés d'intergroupes, révocation

*“Citizenship is more than an individual exchange of freedoms for rights; it is also membership in a body politic, a nation, and a community. To be deemed fair, a system must offer its citizens equal opportunities for public recognition, and groups cannot systematically suffer from misrecognition in the form of stereotype and stigma.”*  
— Melissa V. Harris-Perry (2011)



## INTRODUCTION

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In the context of the war on terror, several Western governments passed legislation that makes it easier to revoke the citizenships of dual and multiple nationals. These new policies take revocation procedures further away from courtrooms, and leave them to ministerial discretion. Under this new system, the appropriate cabinet minister makes the decision whether to revoke an individual's citizenship. The criteria for revocation revolve around treason, terrorism, criminal activity and public interest. However, these criteria are not always well-defined. In the absence of precedent, it is unclear how often and how widely the ministers will exercise their new powers. Another issue of uncertainty is the fate of denationalized individuals, who have little or no right to an appeal. No longer being citizens, they are likely to get deported, or be denied entry if already abroad, making it difficult for them to pursue a hearing.

Some scholars argue that these new policies reflect the changing nature of citizenship in the age of global terror, and particularly “the Islamist kind” (Joppke 2016, 728). Others disagree on the grounds of equality. They point out that revocation policies apply differently to mono and dual nationals, and seriously weaken the citizenship status of the latter, creating a two-tiered political community (Macklin 2015, 4).

This is a new development, and accordingly, a new debate. Our knowledge on the social consequences of differential revocation policies is thus rather limited. Nevertheless, earlier research indicates that there usually is a surge in the suspicion and hatred of dual or naturalized citizens in times of war (Gibney 2013a, 649). The emergence of similar attitudes in the post-9/11 climate of terror is thus not surprising. However, contemporary societies are more diverse than ever, due to globalization. Therefore, widespread suspicion of dual citizens may have more serious social consequences in this age, especially when affirmed by the state.

This issue has a normative aspect as well. Democracies are, at least in principle, based on equality. All citizens in a democracy are expected to be subject to the same set of rules. Making two different sets of membership rules for two large groups of citizens thus violates one of the core principles of democracy. It may be argued, on the one hand, that revocation policies will probably denationalize only a small number of dual and multiple nationals. But, on the other hand, they will signal that dual

nationals, naturalized citizens, and many native-born individuals are not full members of the political community.

This study focuses on the social consequences of these policy arrangements. It investigates how differential citizenship revocation policies influence majority-minority relations. The investigation involves the systematic analysis of anti-immigrant attitudes. The study employs multilevel regression analysis, using data from European Values Study (2008), European Social Survey (2014), and Eurobarometer (2015) that cover thirty countries in total.

## BACKGROUND

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Mono-nationality was the dominant principle for most of the twentieth century. In fact, the League of Nations Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, dated 12 April 1930, states that “it is in the general interest of the international community to secure that all its members should recognise that every person should have a nationality and should have one nationality only” (League of Nations 1930). The exclusive nature of citizenship was an extension of nation-states’ exclusive sovereignty over their demarcated territories (Blatter 2011, 771). As citizenship indicated where one’s loyalty lied, dual nationality implied divided loyalties. Hence the suspicion of dual nationals (Gibney 2013a, 656).

The principle of mono-nationality did not necessitate permanence, however. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also makes that clear in 1948: “Everyone has the right to a nationality. / No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.” Still, when acquiring a new nationality, one was expected to renounce the existing citizenship, unless revocation was automatic. If a second citizenship was acquired by birth, the person was to choose between the two on reaching maturity.<sup>1</sup>

In the 1950s and 1960s, the international community revisited the issue of citizenship revocation, as governments had denationalized large numbers of citizens in the first half of the twentieth century (Arendt 1951, 278). The U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), and the U.N. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961) offered further protections against expatriation. Still, these protocols were developed in the framework of mono-nationality, and with the objective of minimizing statelessness.

The real shift in policy occurred in the 1970s, when states started to allow dual nationality to larger extents. Several developments were influential in this policy shift, but the change in human rights norms, and especially gender roles was the main driving factor (Faist and Gerdes 2008, 5). Traditionally, a woman’s country of citizenship depended on her father at birth. When a woman married a non-national,

she automatically lost her citizenship, and adopted that of her husband; hence the sexist language in the above excerpt from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Relaxing the policy of mono-nationality allowed women to maintain their original citizenships, to pass them on to their children, and to retain legal ties to their countries of origin. Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the European Convention on Nationality (1997) address these issues.

### **BACK TO A SECURITY-ORIENTED CITIZENSHIP?**

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As the world globalized, mobilization and migration became increasingly common. Societies became ethnically more diverse, especially in the developed world. Accordingly, the relaxation of citizenship policies continued. In the 1990s and 2000s, more countries allowed dual nationality, and the share of dual nationals in the general population further increased (Blatter, Erdmann, and Schwanke 2009, 19). However, the security threats in the post-9/11 world led some countries to pass legislation that makes it easier to revoke the citizenships of dual nationals.

For example, in Britain, the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act (2006) provided the Home Secretary with the authority to denationalize any British citizen with dual or multiple nationality, given that doing so is “conducive to the public good.” Then, the Immigration Act (2014) made it possible for the British government to proceed with an individual’s denationalization even when it will result in statelessness, if that individual is eligible to apply for and acquire another nationality elsewhere. Under these policies, dual citizens in Britain have the least secure status in the developed world (Joppke 2016, 733). In fact, Britain now uses the same criteria for dual nationals and non-citizens to judge whether they should be deported (Gibney 2015, 40).<sup>2</sup>

As of early 2017, Australia is the closest country to Britain in terms of its citizenship revocation policies for dual nationals, due to recent legislation.<sup>3</sup> First, the Australian Citizenship Act (2007a) made it more difficult to acquire Australian citizenship by extending the minimum required residence period before naturalization, and increasing the security measures on data collection and storage on prospective citizens. In the same year, the Citizenship Testing Act (2007b) introduced an English-only citizenship test. Then, the Allegiance Act (2015) gave the Immigration Minister the authority to revoke the citizenships of dual citizens who are fourteen or older, and are convicted of serious crimes.

Not all countries have revised their citizenship policies in that direction, however. Germany and the United States, for example, continue to offer strong status security. In the case of Germany, citizenship status is under constitutional protection. Article 16 of the Basic Law states, “No German may be deprived of his citizen-

ship.” Revocation can occur under only two conditions. The first is the voluntary acquisition of a second citizenship, as Germany does not allow dual citizenship even with other EU member-states, unless the citizen in pursuit of a second citizenship applies for and obtains a special permission (*Beibehaltungsgenehmigung*) from the German government first. The second is serving in the armed forces of a foreign country. Even in cases of citizenship acquisition by fraud, the German government can proceed with revocation only within five years of naturalization.<sup>4</sup> In the United States, a landmark decision by the Supreme Court in 1967 limited denationalization almost solely to voluntary relinquishment.<sup>5</sup> Since then, the same set of rules apply to the native-born and naturalized citizens.<sup>6</sup>

Canada approached the deprivationist end of the spectrum with the Strengthening of Canadian Citizenship Act (2014), commonly referred to as Bill C-24. As its counterparts in Australia and Britain, the Act makes it easier to revoke the citizenships of dual nationals who engage in treason and terrorism on the discretion of the Minister. The procedure is similar to that in Australia. The prerequisite for revocation is conviction of a crime that threatens national security.<sup>7</sup> What distinguishes the Canadian case is that this crime need not be committed inside Canada, or even be determined by a Canadian court. It is sufficient that it qualifies as a terrorism offense under Canadian law. Although it is possible for courts in countries with limited judicial independence to make unjust decisions, this requirement still offers some additional degree of protection against revocation.<sup>8</sup>

In addition to the above cases, Denmark, France and Netherlands also made it easier to revoke the citizenships of dual nationals (de Groot and Vink 2014; Lavi 2011). Austria, Norway and others are considering adopting similar measures (Joppke 2016, 732; Spiro 2015, 7). A scholarly debate accompanies this policy trend, and addresses the issue primarily in the context of state-citizen relations.

## SCHOLARLY RESPONSES

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Scholarly responses to the recent shift in revocation policies are newly emerging. Despite their differences on a range of issues, existing perspectives can be roughly categorized in two, as *conditionalist* and *unconditionalist*. Conditionalists consider citizenship to be a privilege, and not a right, and accordingly “a relationship with the state,” rather than “a right held against the state” (Aleinikoff 1986, 1488). As any other relationship, they argue, citizenship too is subject to revisions, and liberal citizenship is currently in a phase of “inevitable lightening” (Joppke 2010, 156), which makes both acquisition and revocation easier (Joppke 2016, 729). Conditionalists argue that a sovereign political community can banish its enemies, albeit members, especially in the age of global terrorism, which spreads fear, disrupts social order,

and threatens the very community that citizenship implies membership in (Barry and Ferracioli 2016; Joppke 2016; Lavi 2011). There are others who share the above perspective, but nevertheless oppose denationalization for practical reasons, such as the ease of prosecuting a citizen (Paskalev 2015, 15).

Unconditionalists, however, consider citizenship to be an inalienable “meta-right,” or “a right to have rights” (Arendt 1951, 296), and thus irrevocable, unless acquired by fraudulent means (Macklin 2015, 2). Further, unconditionalists consider recent revocation<sup>9</sup> policies to be in violation of the core democratic principle of equality, as they apply selectively to dual citizens, and create a two-tiered political community in which one group of citizens has a less secure status (Abu-Laban 2004; Macklin 2014).<sup>10</sup>

Scholars on both sides of the debate agree that citizenship revocation is associated with authoritarian regimes, and has an infamous legacy, including that of Nazi Germany (Joppke 2016, 728). In addition, despite their support for the recent revocation policies, those in the conditionalist camp acknowledge the need for more robust procedures, especially pertaining to the right to appeal, and be present during the trial (Schuck 2015, 9). Ongoing disagreements revolve primarily around the question of whether the state should have a right to revoke the citizenships of dual nationals who wage war against the political community they are legally a part of.

## MAJORITY-MINORITY RELATIONS IN TWO-TIERED CITIZENRY

Conditionalists support their arguments primarily with the novel challenges of global terror, and the changing nature of citizenship as a concept. These developments and others, conditionalists argue, make it possible to make a case for banishment within a liberal framework.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, several questions still stand. What are the implications of “lite citizenship” on democratic societies? What are the distinguishing characteristics of political communities whose members vary in terms of the security of their status? More specifically, what are the influences of two-tiered citizenry on intergroup relations?

These are questions of political sociology. They are different from the normative question of whether mono and dual nationals ought to have the same degree of status security. In other words, the conditionalist case for banishment may very well be consistent with a liberal framework, but this consistency does not necessarily offer any protection against social costs. Likewise, even if we assume that unconditionalists are right about their normative arguments against revocation, we still need to investigate the political sociology of two-tiered citizenry, as we still know little about it.

The emergence of the literature on citizenship regimes is fairly recent. Scholars who investigate citizenship regimes tend to focus on the ethnic-civic divide in the con-

ceptualization of citizenship, and analyze their influence on the attitudes toward minorities (Brubaker 1992). Scholars in that subfield tend to find that inclusionary citizenship regimes tend to make majority members more tolerant (Schlueter, Meuleman and Davidov 2013; Wright 2011). However, they focus solely on the rules that govern the acquisition of citizenship. Revocation of citizenship gained salience as a policy issue only after the “securitisation” (Macklin 2007) and “segmentation” (Abu-Laban 2004) of immigration and citizenship in recent years, and thus have been largely overlooked. It is not surprising for earlier works to focus on acquisition policies, as our understanding of migration and citizenship shifted gradually from mono-nationality, which was the rule for most of the twentieth century. Toward the end of the millennium, diversity became more common and tolerated (Triadafilopoulos 2007, 28). In the post-9/11 world, however, heightened security concerns became an integral part of the mix. In other words, there was no turning the clock back, so migration remained in progress, but the associated processes came under an increased security oversight, which now continues even after the acquisition of citizenship. Therefore, acquisition principles such as *jus soli* or *jus sanguinis* can no longer fully capture citizenship regimes. Security-oriented measures and government discretion also need to be taken into consideration, as they introduce additional filters to the processes of naturalization and denaturalization. During naturalization, some applications are rejected, due to security concerns, and in a discretionary manner. Other applicants are naturalized, but the acquisition of citizenship is no longer the end of the road for them. Their status is conditional, and subject to withdrawal, due again to security concerns. These measures have salient implications in intergroup relations. In Macklin’s words,

state practices that marginalize and stigmatize [immigrants/minorities] through heightened surveillance, harassment, ethnic profiling, and the like ... may reverberate in discrimination in domains such as employment, financial relations and associational life. The effect is to alienate the subject from social citizenship, even if legal citizenship is already secured. And while many look to the criminal law to protect us from the enemy within, I urge us to attend to the law’s role in producing the alien within. (2001, 398)

In the post-9/11 context, the enemy within is “virtually always Muslim and male” (Macklin 2015, 1). Similarly, those whose citizenships are revoked are usually from Muslim-majority countries such as Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Somalia, and Sudan (Joppke 2016, 744). Therefore, one may further argue that such state practices marginalize and stigmatize Muslim immigrants primarily. This perspective is in line with the view that “the immigrant has become Muslim” (Allievi 2005). Unsurprisingly, the emerging migration and citizenship literature focuses not only on immigrants in general, but also on Muslim immigrants in particular (Adida, Laitin and Valfort 2016; Wright et al. 2017. For a recent review, see Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014.)

Overall, the securitization of citizenship places all immigrants and most minorities in a different category. This is especially problematic in an increasingly diverse world, where human mobility is the rule, rather than the exception. Contemporary societies are composed of large segments of naturalized and prospective citizens. There are also many native-born citizens with dual or multiple citizenships, as children inherit their parents' citizenships (Lenard 2016, 81). For example, in Canada, as of 2011, non-citizens corresponded to 6.33 percent of the population, whereas dual and multiple citizens amounted to 3.02 percent. Of the latter group, 18.48 percent were native-born (Statistics Canada 2012). Legal segmentation along these lines is thus likely to lead to serious social consequences. The below hypotheses derive from the above discussion.

H1: In countries where naturalized immigrants have low status security, majority members should be more likely to hold negative attitudes toward immigrants.

H2: In countries where naturalized immigrants have low status security, majority members should be more likely to hold negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants.

## DATA AND METHOD

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To test the above hypothesis, this study uses individual-level data from three survey studies: the fourth and latest wave of the European Values Study (EVS) in 2008, the seventh and latest wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) in 2014, and the Standard Eurobarometer 83.3 in 2015. They cover thirty, twenty and twenty-eight countries, respectively. The countries included by the Eurobarometer and the ESS are subsets of the thirty European countries in the EVS. (See Tables 1, 2 and 3 for a complete list of included countries.)

### *Individual-Level Variables*

This study analyzes three dependent variables. They all measure anti-immigrant attitudes, but differ in dimension and scope. The first dependent variable focuses on Muslim immigrants specifically, and is based on the following question in the EVS: "On this list are various groups of people. Could you please tell me any that you would not, generally speaking, like to have as neighbours?" When answering this question, respondents look at a show card that lists fifteen groups, including Muslims. The survey codes fifteen binary variables out of the responses to indicate whether a group was mentioned or not. Following Hooghe and Vroome (2015), the second dependent variable is a composite of three items that are tied to survey questions in the ESS that ask respondents to indicate, on a scale of zero to ten, the extent to which they think immigrants are good/bad for the economy, undermine/enrich cultural life, and make the country a better/worse place to live. (Cronbach's alpha = .85) The third and final dependent variable is based on a question in the

**TABLE 1.** The Structure of Variables (EVS)

	N	Age	Male	Edu.	Urban	Postm.	Anti-Mus. prej.
Austria	1297	46.7	43.4	3.1	3.9	0.43	32.1
Belgium	1205	47.9	48.5	3.2	4.7	0.51	16.2
Britain	1301	52.0	42.0	2.8	4.9	0.49	14.4
Bulgaria	1440	50.5	41.7	3.1	4.4	0.32	19.2
Croatia	1233	45.7	39.7	3.0	3.4	0.40	17.4
Cyprus	908	51.0	44.8	2.5	5.1	0.39	37.2
Czech Republic	1683	47.9	45.5	3.1	4.2	0.40	31.6
Denmark	1356	50.1	49.5	3.5	4.0	0.54	13.6
Estonia	983	49.7	36.2	3.1	3.7	0.36	37.1
Finland	1112	45.8	49.0	4.0	5.3	0.49	23.5
France	1200	50.9	45.1	3.1	4.3	0.43	8.1
Germany	1862	50.3	47.3	3.3	4.0	0.50	27.8
Greece	1240	49.8	44.8	2.6	4.2	0.45	18.3
Hungary	1454	44.3	48.1	3.1	4.4	0.38	10.9
Ireland	898	46.1	39.9	2.9	3.2	0.36	23.4
Italy	1457	47.1	48.0	2.7	4.5	0.50	22.7
Latvia	969	45.6	37.4	3.5	4.3	0.38	32.0
Lithuania	1333	46.3	45.9	3.5	4.4	0.38	48.6
Luxembourg	566	42.5	50.5	3.0	2.9	0.40	20.7
Malta	1387	52.5	37.6	2.2	3.4	0.34	32.4
Netherlands	1390	52.3	45.5	3.1	5.1	0.54	19.8
Norway	955	46.5	52.4	3.6	4.3	0.53	13.9
Poland	1469	44.2	44.1	3.2	4.2	0.35	25.0
Portugal	1438	54.1	40.3	1.6	2.7	0.29	15.4
Romania	1470	47.9	43.4	2.7	4.3	0.32	23.0
Slovakia	1369	53.2	40.2	3.0	3.2	0.36	22.8
Slovenia	1127	48.8	45.6	2.6	2.5	0.46	29.9
Spain	1327	49.4	43.6	2.4	5.4	0.39	13.5
Sweden	935	49.2	47.8	3.6	5.0	0.55	15.9
Switzerland	791	52.8	46.2	3.3	3.3	0.45	13.5
Average	1239	48.7	44.5	3.0	4.1	0.42	22.7

Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note: All values in the table are arithmetic means, except for those in Male and Anti-Muslim Prejudice columns, which reflect percentages.

Eurobarometer that asks respondents about the extent of immigrants' contribution to the country. Responses to this question are coded on a five-point scale.

**TABLE 2.** The Structure of Variables (ESS)

	N	Age	Male	Edu.	Urban	Anti-imm. sent.
Austria	1420	49.2	47.8	12.3	1.9	5.61
Belgium	1343	48.5	50.7	13.3	1.6	5.14
Britain	1758	53.7	44.9	13.3	2.0	5.51
Czech Republic	1930	45.8	46.9	12.8	2.3	6.18
Denmark	1307	48.6	53.0	13.1	2.2	4.61
Estonia	1173	48.3	42.4	13.3	2.4	4.95
Finland	1946	52.1	49.3	13.3	1.9	4.16
France	1431	50.2	49.0	12.8	2.2	5.18
Germany	2474	50.5	51.9	14.2	2.0	4.32
Hungary	1625	48.6	42.5	12.2	2.2	5.84
Ireland	1977	50.9	45.8	13.5	1.6	5.01
Lithuania	2005	48.1	38.4	12.5	2.3	5.03
Netherlands	1579	52.1	44.3	13.6	2.0	4.68
Norway	1195	48.0	53.3	13.8	1.8	4.40
Poland	1523	45.7	46.0	12.3	2.0	4.62
Portugal	1123	53.2	45.0	8.5	2.1	5.17
Slovenia	1012	49.9	45.6	12.2	1.6	5.59
Spain	1713	48.5	51.9	12.6	1.9	4.80
Sweden	1419	51.1	50.0	13.0	2.0	3.52
Switzerland	899	50.6	51.3	10.8	1.5	4.33
<b>Averages</b>	<b>1543</b>	<b>49.7</b>	<b>47.5</b>	<b>12.7</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>4.93</b>

Source: European Social Survey (2014)

Note: All values in the table are arithmetic means, except for those in the Male column, which reflects percent-ages.

The second and third of the above variables gauge general feelings and opinions regarding immigrants. The first is a social distance measure (Bogardus 1925, 301). For lack of better terms, this study refers to the former as sentiments, and the latter as prejudice, while using attitudes as an umbrella term for the two.

On the other side of the causal arrow, the study controls for five individual-level factors with theoretical links to the dependent variables. Age is numerical, and reflects the respondents' ages. Gender is coded in binary. Education ranges from 0 (*no formal education*) to 6 (*second stage of tertiary education*) in the EVS. In the ESS, it reflects years of schooling. In the Eurobarometer, it indicates the ages the respondent left full-time education. Urban versus rural living area ranges from 0 (*under 2,000*) to 8 (*over 500,000*) in the EVS, and from 0 (*a farm or home in the countryside*) to 4 (*a big city*) in the ESS. Finally, postmaterialism, which is present only in the

**TABLE 3.** The Structure of Variables (Eurobarometer)

	N	Age	Male	Edu.	Urban	Anti-imm. sent.
Austria	1032	47.8	46.9	19.1	1.0	1.6
Belgium	1014	51.1	49.1	19.4	0.7	1.7
Britain	1306	51.7	45.9	18.1	1.0	1.3
Bulgaria	1063	48.8	46.1	19.6	1.2	2.1
Croatia	1008	44.4	42.5	19.0	0.7	1.8
Cyprus	500	49.2	46.2	18.3	1.0	2.1
Czech Republic	1021	46.1	42.8	18.9	1.0	2.3
Denmark	1020	54.4	47.5	24.1	1.1	1.5
Estonia	1001	53.0	37.1	20.4	1.0	2.4
Finland	1013	54.5	46.9	22.9	0.9	1.3
France	997	50.4	45.3	19.3	1.0	1.6
Germany	1554	51.6	49.7	18.8	0.9	1.5
Greece	999	48.6	49.1	18.1	1.2	1.9
Hungary	1055	48.9	39.8	17.9	1.0	2.1
Ireland	1018	47.0	47.0	18.8	1.1	1.2
Italy	1028	48.9	47.9	17.5	1.1	1.9
Latvia	1005	46.7	36.3	19.9	1.1	2.3
Lithuania	1003	54.5	38.5	19.4	1.2	1.8
Luxembourg	504	49.1	51.6	19.9	0.8	1.0
Malta	504	54.0	42.3	17.3	0.6	2.0
Netherlands	1010	50.5	47.4	20.9	0.8	1.5
Poland	998	47.2	39.9	19.7	0.9	1.7
Portugal	1000	49.7	41.9	15.3	0.8	1.0
Romania	1007	47.2	49.7	19.0	0.8	1.3
Slovakia	1051	49.9	43.8	18.7	0.7	2.2
Slovenia	1008	51.0	40.0	19.3	1.0	1.8
Spain	1002	49.2	47.6	17.3	0.9	1.3
Sweden	1037	55.9	54.6	24.9	1.2	0.7
Average	991	50.0	45.1	19.4	1.0	1.7

Source: Eurobarometer (2015)

Note: All values in the table are arithmetic means, except for those in the Male column, which reflects percentages.

analysis with the EVS due to data limitations, is based on the Inglehart Index, and takes three values: 0 (*materialist*), 0.5 (*mixed*), and 1 (*postmaterialist*). Tables 1, 2 and 3 provide further details on individual-level data.<sup>12</sup>

**TABLE 4.** The Structure of the Country-Level Factors

	Status Security 2009	Status Security 2014	Size of Muslims 2010	Size of Immigrants 2015
Australia	57.143	58.333	1.9	28
Austria	14.286	16.667	5.7	17
Belgium	42.857	75.000	6.0	12
Britain	42.857	50.000	4.6	13
Bulgaria	28.571	33.333	13.4	1
Croatia		41.667	1.3	14
Cyprus	7.143	8.333	0.6	17
Czech Republic	57.143	66.667	0.1	4
Denmark	42.857	33.333	4.1	10
Estonia	21.429	16.667	0.1	15
Finland	64.286	66.667	0.8	6
France	35.714	41.667	7.5	12
Germany	64.286	75.000	5.0	15
Greece	7.143	8.333	4.7	11
Hungary	35.714	50.000	0.3	5
Ireland	14.286	16.667	0.9	16
Italy	71.429	75.000	2.6	10
Japan	50.000	58.333	0.1	2
Latvia	0.000	0.000	0.1	13
Lithuania	7.143	8.333	0.1	5
Luxembourg	57.143	66.667	2.3	44
Malta	7.143	8.333	0.3	10
Netherlands	64.286	66.667	5.5	12
New Zealand		58.333	0.9	23
Norway	50.000	41.667	3.0	14
Poland	42.857	91.667	0.1	2
Portugal	57.143	66.667	0.6	8
Romania	28.571	33.333	0.3	1
Slovakia	21.429	25.000	0.1	3
Slovenia	28.571	33.333	2.4	11
South Korea	35.714	41.667	0.2	3
Spain	64.286	66.667	2.3	13
Sweden	85.714	83.333	4.9	17
Switzerland	57.143	50.000	5.7	29
Turkey	14.286	16.667		4
USA	28.571	33.333	0.8	14

Sources: Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), United Nations Population Division, Pew Research Center.

Notes: Status Security figures range from 0 to 100, higher values indicating stronger status security. Immigrant size figures reflect proportions in general population.

### ***Country-Level Variables***

The Security of Status component of the MIPEX index serves as the key independent variable of this study. The component is composed of six indicators that measure the extent to which state laws restrict access to and withdraw citizenship privileges for reasons other than fraud: (1) refusal due to threats to public policy or national security, (2) a discretionary, rather than legal/objective procedure, (3) the right to appeal, (4) withdrawal due to threats to public policy or national security, (5) possibility of withdrawal without any time limits after acquisition, and (6) withdrawal potentially leading to statelessness.<sup>13</sup> Each of these six variables is coded on a scale of 0 to 100, from low status security to high. The overall index value for status security is also on the same scale, as it is the arithmetic average of the indicators. Analyses with the EVS use the third wave of the MIPEX data from 2009, whereas those with the Eurobarometer and the ESS use the fourth wave from 2014. In the former analyses, the score for Croatia is from 2014, as the country was not included in the index before then.<sup>14</sup>

In addition to status security, the models control for the size of immigrants, as measured by their proportion in the general population. Data on the size of immigrants come from the United Nations Population Division, whereas the data on the size of Muslims come from the Pew Research Center. Table 4 provides further details on the country-level data. (For other individual and country level variables that were not included in the analyses, see the Robustness Checks section.)

### ***Multilevel Regression***

The study employs multilevel regression analysis, which allows contextual analysis by clustering the data by country (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). Interclass correlation coefficients indicate a level-2 variance of 4.74 to 19.7 percent across data. These variance figures are in line with the larger literature on anti-immigrant prejudice (Callens and Meuleman 2017; Schlueter, Meuleman and Davidov 2013). Due to the binary and continuous coding of the dependent variables, analyses include both linear and logistic regression. To increase accuracy and facilitate convergence, the values of the age, status security, and immigrant size variables are standardized. The education variable is standardized only for the analysis with the Eurobarometer data, due to its wider scale. As the study focuses on the attitudes of majority members, first and second generation immigrants, Muslims, and non-citizens are excluded from the analyses.

The models were fit with the lme4 package (v. 1.1) in R (v. 3.3). The package uses maximum likelihood estimation with Laplace approximation in linear models, and REML estimator in logistic regression. Reported estimates in logistic regression model are log odds. The xtmixed and meqlogit procedures in Stata 14 verified the results. There were no cases of high multicollinearity. VIF values were always below 2.0.

**TABLE 5.** Multilevel Regression Models of Prejudice

	Anti-Muslim Prejudice (2008)	Anti-Immigrant Sentiments (2014)	Anti-Immigrant Sentiments (2015)
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Key variable</i>			
Security of status	-0.191 * (.083)	-0.276 * (.127)	-0.268 ** (.093)
<i>The individual-level</i>			
Age	0.068 *** (.013)	0.058 *** (.013)	0.112 *** (.008)
Gender (male)	0.225 *** (.026)	-0.056 ** (.026)	-0.010 (.015)
Education	-0.138 *** (.011)	-0.531 *** (.011)	-0.124 *** (.008)
Urban	-0.028 *** (.006)	-0.085 *** (.006)	-0.069 *** (.010)
Postmaterialism	-0.488 *** (.044)		
<i>The country-level</i>			
Size of immigrants		-0.267 * (.116)	-0.187 * (.080)
Size of Muslims	-0.145 (.086)		
Intercept	-0.680 *** (.093)	5.122 *** (.124)	2.284 *** (.096)
AIC	38,059	127,046	89,763
BIC	38,136	127,121	89,838
Log-likelihood	-19,021	-63,514	-44,873
Deviance	38,041	127,028	89,745
N			
Countries	30	20	28
Individuals	37,320	30,841	27,758
Source	EVS	ESS	Eurobarometer

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

### Missing Data

The mice package in R imputed the missing data with stochastic regression after five iterations. Adaptive Rounding Procedure rounded the binary variables by calculating a standardized threshold (Bernards, Belin and Schafer 2007). This method produces more reliable results than native rounding methods that apply a threshold of 0.50 to all binary variables (Enders 2010).

## RESULTS

Table 5 provides the results of three multilevel regression analyses for anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe. Model 1 is a logistic multilevel regression model for anti-Muslim prejudice, and Models 2 and 3 are linear multilevel regression models for anti-immigrant sentiments. The specification of the three models are near-identical.

The results are highly consistent across models. More importantly for the purposes of this paper, all three estimates of the status security variable in Models 1 through 3 are statistically significant on confidence levels of .05, .05, and .01, respectively. These results indicate that, in countries that offer a secure status to naturalized immigrants, majority members are significantly less likely to hold negative attitudes toward immigrants in general, and Muslim immigrants in particular. H1 and H2 are supported.




Fig. 1. Predicted Probabilities of Prejudice.

Immigrant size returns significant results in Models 2 and 3 only. Both significances are on a .05 confidence level. Estimates have negative signs, indicating that, in contexts of larger immigration, individuals are less likely to hold negative attitudes toward immigrants. On the individual level, the results indicate that older people, less educated people, those who reside in rural areas, and materialists are less likely to be tolerant. Only the gender variable returns inconsistent results.

### ***Practical Significance***

The predicted probabilities plot in Figure 1 demonstrates the practical significance of the above findings. The plot is based on Model 1, and reflects the probability of anti-Muslim prejudice in the countries with lowest and highest status security levels. (The figures on the x axis are standardized values.) The low and high points in Figure 1 correspond to Latvia (0.00) and Sweden (85.71). Everything else being constant, the probability of anti-Muslim prejudice is 27.5 percent in Latvia. The figure drops almost in half to 15.0 percent in Sweden.

## ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

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To test the robustness of the above results, this section addresses potential issues related to (1) alternative explanations, (2) effect heterogeneity and interactions, (3) operationalization of key variables, and (4) level-2 outliers.

### *Alternative Explanations*

Despite their theoretical relevance, two individual-level variables were not included in any of the models, due to their high proportion of missing values: political ideology and religious affiliation. In all three surveys, the political ideology variable is based on self-report on a 10 or 11-point left-right scale, from left to right. When the political ideology variable is added to the three models, it always returns highly significant estimates with p-values lower than .001, indicating that individuals with right-wing political ideologies are significantly more likely to hold negative attitudes toward immigrants. The inclusion of the political ideology variable in the models does not drive security status out of significance, which is not surprising, as the two variables operate on different levels.

Religious affiliation variables reflect Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant backgrounds, and are coded in binary. The variables often return significant estimates, but these significances are never consistent across models. In fact, they are sometimes in different directions. Nevertheless, this is the rule, rather than the exception in this subliterature (Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002, 244).

On the country-level, a variety of controls returns mixed results. Among macro-economic variables, GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) returns insignificant estimates in all models but Model 3. Similarly, unemployment is significant only in Model 1. Among social fractionalization variables, ethnic fractionalization is significant only in Model 3, religious fractionalization is significant in Models 1 and 2, and linguistic fractionalization only in Model 3. Among institutional variables, anti-discrimination laws and democracy level are significant only in Model 3. Finally, among macro-religious variables, the presence of a state church, government favors and privileges extended to the majority religion, and the government regulation of religion are consistently insignificant across models.<sup>15</sup>

### *Effect Heterogeneity and Interactions*

It is possible for different segments of the population to respond differently to revocation policies. For example, it is theoretically sensible for individuals on the right-wing to react more strongly to immigrants in equal citizenship contexts. Similarly, less-educated individuals who face greater competition in a globalized economy may be more inclined to hold negative attitudes toward immigrants in more inclusionary

political contexts. However, cross-level interactions do not return any significant results that suggest such an influence. It is possible to test a similar effect on the contextual level as well. That is, the influence of citizenship policies may vary in low and high-immigration contexts. But the interaction between the two level-2 variables do not indicate any such effects either.

### ***Operationalization of Key Variables***

The indicators that make up the Security of Status component of MIPEX are additive. In other words, they are simply added together and averaged, with the assumption that their influence on the tested outcomes are similar, and not statistically different. However, we do not know whether that really is the case. To test whether some components have more weight on the outcome than others, the three models are rerun with a different individual component each time in a series of analyses. None of the individual components returned consistently significant results, indicating that the overall status security matters more than its individual components.

### ***Level-2 Outliers***

In multilevel regression models, several influential cases on level-2 can induce a significant estimate, especially when the sample size on level-2 is low. It is thus important to identify such clusters, and then test whether the significances in Table 5 will hold after their exclusion from the analyses. In models 1 through 3, the DFBETAS diagnostic test identified nine, three and five influential cases, respectively. After iterative elimination of these cases, all of the remaining values were populated within the cutoff points (Van der Meer, Te Grotenhuis and Pelzer 2010, 177). When these models were rerun without the identified cases, the estimate of the key variable remained significant in all three models. However, without the influential cases, the significance of the estimate reduced from .01 to .05 in Model 3.

## **CONCLUSION**

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This study analyzed the influence of status security on the attitudes toward immigrants. The results indicate that, in countries that provide immigrants with a less secure status, majority members are significantly more likely to have negative attitudes toward immigrants. These results hold for immigrants in general, and Muslim immigrants in particular.

These findings suggest that the warnings of unconditionalists against two-tiered citizenry are well-reasoned (Forcese 2014; Lenard 2016; Macklin 2014). They do not mean, however, that revoking the citizenships of dual nationals is inconsistent with a liberal framework. They merely indicate that consistency with a liberal framework

does not necessarily offer immunity against negative majority-minority relations (Joppke 2016; Lavi 2011; Schuck 2015).

This study has three shortcomings, all due to data limitations. First, Model 1 uses only one of Bogardus's (1925, 301) seven social distance measures, as data do not allow a multi-item measure. Secondly and relatedly, social distance measure of the EVS gauge only negative attitudes, and cannot capture sympathy or tolerance. Therefore, the absence of prejudice does not translate into the presence of tolerance in Model 1. Third and finally, this study cannot rule out endogeneity, which is a common problem in the literature on intergroup relations (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). More precisely, it is possible for majority members who harbor negative attitudes toward immigrants to support and help pass legislation that limits their rights. The ESS allows an opportunity to investigate this possibility. Of the three data sets used in this study, the ESS is the only one that has identical questions on the dependent variable, *and* better-corresponding years to those of MIPEX. The ESS has rotating themes. The survey covered the theme of immigration in its first and seventh waves in 2002 and 2014, respectively. As most policy changes occurred between these two waves, longitudinal examination of the ESS data may indicate which of the two phenomena are ontologically prior to the other. MIPEX I in 2005 covers fifteen European countries, twelve of which are covered by both waves of the ESS. Some of these twelve countries had similar policies in 2005, and thus had equal scores on status security, but then their policies took different directions. Germany and Ireland are two such cases where the most divergent policy shifts occurred. Both Germany and Ireland scored 1.67 out of 3.00 on status security in MIPEX I in 2005. However, Germany further strengthened the status security of its citizens to score 75 out of 100 in 2014, whereas Ireland's score decreased as low as 16.67. The aggregated averages of anti-immigrant sentiments indicate an 8.3 percent decrease in Germany, and a 1.7 percent increase in Ireland between 2002 and 2014, as predicted by H1. None of the remaining ten cases allow a similar comparison, primarily because the changes in their scores are not as dramatically different across time. Nevertheless, an examination of individual cases confirm the same pattern.<sup>16</sup>

## POLICY IMPLICATIONS

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It is not rare for governments to discriminate against dual citizens in times of war, and to justify their discriminatory policies with claims of treason or similar crimes against the state. Lenard finds such reasoning problematic in that "it assumes a connection between citizenship status and an alleged propensity to carry out crimes, which is then used to justify differential punishment for the same crimes" (2016, 83). Dual citizens seem to be enduring another such episode, this time in the context of

the war on terror. The future of this policy trend is uncertain. Another matter of uncertainty is implementation, and particularly the nature and the extent of the use of ministerial discretion. Reverting to former policies is also a possibility, as has been the case in Canada with Bill C-6, which repealed Bill C-24 in 2017. However, one thing seems to be certain for the foreseeable future: the number of dual and multiple citizens will continue to increase, along with diversity (Sejersen 2008, 525).

The findings of this study imply that creating a two-tiered citizenry is a questionable way to manage diversity. Revocation policies that eliminate even the right to an appeal send strong messages to both majority and minority members about their places in the political community. Governments that pass such legislation may be guided by the right motives, but they may as well be underestimating the potential ramifications of differential policies. As Forcese points out, selective revocation may very well serve the opposite of the intended purpose by inculcating “a sense of second-class citizenship among the affected communities” (2014, 583). In addition, as the findings of this study suggest, majority members in a segmented polity may be more inclined to view immigrants – naturalized or otherwise – through negative lenses. In sum, differential revocation policies may help governments deport some dangerous individuals. But they may also create millions of frustrated minority members with further racialized identities.

## NOTES

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1. For more on the history and evolution of dual nationality, see Faist (2007).
2. For more on the history and evolution of citizenship revocation in the United Kingdom, see Gibney (2013b).
3. For a chronology of major developments in citizenship policy and law in Australia, see the following page on the Parliament of Australia web site: [http://www.aph.gov.au/About\\_Parliament/Parliamentary\\_Departments/Parliamentary\\_Library/pubs/BN/0910/AustCitizenship](http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/0910/AustCitizenship).
4. In her recent comparative study on citizenship revocation, Mantu notes the following on the German case: “the historical experiences of mass denaturalisation and deportation have made politicians and the administration less ready to use publicly the threat of deprivation of citizenship as a measure to punish certain categories of citizens such as terrorists (United Kingdom) or badly integrated citizens of migrant background (France)” (2015, 325).
5. For landmark cases on citizenship revocation decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, see *Perez v. Brownell*, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), *Trop v. Dulles*, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), *Schneider v. Rusk*, 377 U.S. 163 (1964), *Afroyim v. Rusk*, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), and *Vance v. Terrazas*, 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
6. For more on the history and evolution of citizenship revocation in the United States, see Weil (2013), and Herzog (2015).
7. Since 2013, the Netherlands too revokes the citizenships of dual nationals who are convicted of serious crimes. However, no ministerial discretion is necessary in the Netherlands after conviction (Lenard 2016, 83).
8. For more on Bill C-24, see Forcese (2014). For more on the history and evolution of citizenship in Canada, see Triadafilopoulos (2012).
9. Revocation in this context refers to involuntary denationalization, which excludes voluntary renunciation or its varieties, such as naturalization in a country in cognizance of the fact that doing so will result in the automatic loss of the existing citizenship.
10. In the context of democratic equality, Lenard mentions two other issues: “the power to revoke provides unequal access to security of residence, discriminating as it does against individuals on the basis of their national origin; and ... subjects individuals guilty of the same crime to different, that is, unequal punishments” (2016, 79).
11. That is not to say though that conditionalists consider banishment to be the only appropriate liberal response.

In Joppke's words, "while banishment may be the right response to terror in principle, it is not necessarily the response that a liberal society should wage in practice" (2016, 745).

12. For detailed information on question wordings and coding, see [http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb\\_arch\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm) for Eurobarometer, <http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu> for the EVS, and <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/> for the ESS.

13. In addition, the third wave of the MIPEX data includes a seventh indicator that involves the consideration of the individual's personal characteristics, and ties to the country.

14. For detailed information on MIPEX indicators, see the official MIPEX web site: <http://www.mipex.eu/methodology>.

15. GDP and unemployment data come from the World Bank. Fractionalization data are from Alesina et al. (2003). Anti-discrimination data are from the MIPEX. Democracy data are from the Freedom House. State church data are hand-coded. Government privileges data are from Pew Research Center. Data on the government regulation of religion are from Fox (2008).

16. Austria offered lower status security over the years, and there was an increase in anti-immigrant sentiments. In contrast, Belgium and Sweden increased status security, and anti-immigrant sentiments indicate a decline. The only country that does not fit the pattern is Denmark, where status security decreased from 2.33 out of 3.00 to 33.33 out of 100, and there was a 2.8 percent decrease in anti-immigrant sentiments.

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